Wednesday, November 29, 2006

The Once and Future Kissinger

As another failed war threatens to tarnish his legacy, Henry Kissinger attempts to clarify his record—by evading, skirting, stretching, hedging, and stonewalling like the diplomatic master he is.



The elevator doors open onto Henry Kissinger’s offices to reveal a bulletproof bank teller’s window. The carpets are worn, the walls in need of fresh paint, the wing chairs stained by the hands of a thousand waiting dignitaries. In a corner sits a large planter holding the dried stumps of a long-dead bamboo tree. A Ronald Reagan commemorative album and a picture book of Israel collect dust on a shelf next to a replica of an ancient Greek bust with a missing nose. Across from Kissinger’s door his hundreds of contacts—presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and corporate titans—are catalogued in eight flywheel Rolodexes on his secretary’s desk.

And then you hear it: The Voice, a low rumble from around the corner, like heavy construction on the street outside. When he finally appears, Kissinger—architect of the Vietnam War’s tortured end, Nixon confidant and enabler, alleged war criminal, and Manhattan bon vivant—is smaller than expected: stooped and portly, dressed in a starched white shirt and pants hoisted by suspenders, peering gravely through his iconic glasses. He’s almost cute.

At 83, Kissinger has had heart surgery twice, wears two hearing aids, and is blind in one eye. His once-black hair has turned snowy white. But his presence is startling nonetheless, his Germanic timber so low and gravelly everyone else sounds weak by comparison. He starts our conversation on this late-October morning by placing a silver tape recorder on the coffee table.

“I want a record,” he says.

If Kissinger wants a record, it’s because he wants to correct it. As he nears the end of his public life, yet another disastrous war threatens to taint his legacy. State of Denial, the latest White House exegesis by famed reporter Bob Woodward, depicts Kissinger as privately advising President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney on the war in Iraq, calling him a “powerful, largely invisible influence.” Woodward’s portrait of Kissinger as a surreptitious Rasputin, cooing in the presidential ear that “victory is the only exit strategy,” urging him to resist all entreaties to change course, has rankled the dour statesman.

“Look,” Kissinger begins, eager to discuss the matter without discussing the matter, “I have had contacts with presidents and secretaries of State since the Kennedy administration. I believe what I can do for them is to give them my views without having to worry about getting into a debate with me afterwards about what I may or may not have said. Therefore, you have to understand why I’m reluctant to talk about what specifically I talk to them about.”

But Kissinger is not so reluctant that he will allow the final chapters of his biography to be written without his input. Therefore, it must be pointed out that Woodward “happens to be wrong.”

So he never told the president, as Woodward reports, “Don’t give an inch”?

“Totally untrue,” says Kissinger. “That quote is untrue.”

It doesn’t reflect his position?

“Read my articles.”

I’ve read them, I say. Can’t he answer?

“The least likely thing I’m going to do,” he explains, “is go around Washington beating on doors and saying, ‘I have a hot idea and it’s encapsulated in one sentence and if you just listen to me and if you just hold on, never give an inch.’ ”

That wasn’t exactly what Woodward said, but I don’t press the point. Instead, I try another angle. In the book, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appears to confirm Woodward’s account, I say. “I doubt it,” Kissinger says, shutting me down. “She wasn’t present when I talked to the president to begin with.”

Okay, I say, moving on to an event that seems relatively undeniable: the famous memo from 1969 he gave last year to former Bush speechwriter Michael Gerson suggesting that withdrawing troops from Vietnam would be like giving “salted peanuts” to the public, who would demand more and more, leading to a premature defeat. The handing over of that memo suggests Kissinger was advising the Bush administration to avoid troop withdrawals, right?

“Gerson, whom I don’t know, didn’t know, and have never met again, came in to talk to me about a speech about withdrawals,” he says testily. “I said, ‘If you’re thinking only about withdrawals, look at this memo to show you that it has its own complexity and the major theme of that memo is, ‘You cannot do it in two years.’ ” This should not be read as indicating that Kissinger is entirely against withdrawing troops; he’s just against a timetable. And in any case, he says, “obviously, if I want to influence policy, I don’t go to a speechwriter I’ve never met.”

It’s like playing chess with a master; I gamely move another piece. What does he make of Woodward’s criticism that Kissinger is fighting Vietnam all over again with advice straight out of the Vietnam playbook? Depends on your definition of the playbook, Kissinger argues. To Kissinger, the playbook was the efforts to extract the U.S. from Vietnam, starting with the 1967 Paris peace talks, “which I invented,” he says. “That doesn’t say ‘Don’t give an inch.’ It doesn’t say remotely ‘Don’t give an inch.’ ”


Corbis)

Even Kissinger’s advice that “victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy,” which appeared in a column under his own byline, is an “accurate sentence out of context,” he says.

When all is said and done, Kissinger has done such a thorough job of rebutting Woodward that it starts to worry him. After all, he is not one to alienate the powerful—including a certain famous and well-connected Washington Post journalist. And so later, after thinking it over, Kissinger calls to edit the record yet again.

“I thought about one exchange we had this morning, with respect to the Woodward quote,” he says, in a friendlier tone. “My view is, I have no recollection whatever of ever having said anything like this in connection with Iraq. On the other hand, I think Woodward is an experienced journalist who wouldn’t invent quotes.”

He wants to retract the “totally untrue” comment.

“I don’t want to make it as a flat statement,” says Kissinger.

In saying so little, it seems, he has already said too much.

You can see why this Iraq business so vexes Kissinger. He hardly needs another quagmire around his neck—especially after he played this one so carefully. When the neoconservatives began driving foreign policy after 9/11, the consummate realist hedged his bets and supported the decision to invade Iraq. There were caveats galore, of course: Kissinger said postwar reconstruction of Iraq would require U.N. involvement and international diplomacy and that he was opposed to occupying a Muslim nation in order to “reeducate the country.” He also said preemptive war as a doctrine was a bad idea, except in rare instances.

His standing on Iraq was so nuanced the New York Times included him in a list of prominent Republicans who objected to the war—only to print a tortured editor’s note amending the report after right-wing critics attacked the paper for misrepresenting his views. “I’m not sure the Times got it wrong,” says Walter Isaacson, the president of the Aspen Institute, a former Time managing editor, and the author of the biography Kissinger. “They just pinned him down when he wanted to stay unpinned.”

At New York dinner parties before the invasion in 2003, Kissinger related to friends that he was “very concerned that there was no plan for what happens after they bring it down and topple it,” recounts one associate. “He predicted to a group of people at a dinner that it would end in civil war.”

Despite private reservations, Kissinger openly supported the war. It was no wonder. The public dissent of Brent Scowcroft, Bush Sr.’s national-security adviser and Kissinger’s longtime friend and former business partner, got Scowcroft cut off from the White House inner circle. For Kissinger, this wouldn’t do.

He was already bitter about being largely ignored by the previous two presidents, especially the first Bush administration. “I think there was little question that the first Bush did not engage Henry in any meaningful way. And that soured Henry on the first Bush. He would prefer to be consulted,” says Lawrence Eagleburger, the former secretary of State under Bush Sr. and a Kissinger friend. “If he does a Scowcroft, he’s out in the cold.”

But the second Bush was clearly willing to bring Kissinger in from the cold. In 2002, he appointed Kissinger chairman of the 9/11 Commission, a position that would have put him at the forefront of the national debate on U.S. intelligence failures and capped a long public career with a crowning achievement.

In the vetting process, however, Kissinger ran into a snag. Five years after he left office, the former secretary of State had founded the consulting firm Kissinger Associates and established himself as a kind of diplomatic fixer who could work the back rooms of Moscow, Beijing, and Riyadh for corporations needing influence. He charges $200,000 (a reported $50,000 just to walk through the door) to consult for companies like Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc., a mining company with assets in Indonesia. As much as Kissinger wanted to be the nation’s healer, he valued his business interests more. When Congress requested that he reveal his consulting firm’s client list, he stepped down from the commission.

Nonetheless, Kissinger remained a favorite administration ally, appointed by Donald Rumsfeld to the Defense Policy Board, the outgoing secretary of Defense’s personal think tank. And Cheney told Woodward last year that George W. Bush is a “big fan.” He’s not alone, of course. Kissinger is, after all, a foreign policy genius emeritus, whose exacting skills as a strategic thinker have made him an indispensable adviser to many leaders of the free world. And he’s certainly the guy you call when you’re planning to wage war in the world’s most complicated geopolitical hot spot.


Corbis Sygma)

That Kissinger should now want to distance himself from the war in Iraq should come as no surprise—every hawk from Richard Perle to David Frum is doing the same thing. But Kissinger’s maneuvering is more artful than most.

“I have basically supported the objectives of the strategy, and I want it to come out well,” Kissinger tells me, but he adds that the views expressed in his syndicated newspaper columns “don’t amount to a cheerleading advocacy of every step that has been taken.”

Asked if the White House now understands the need for international legitimacy and diplomatic solutions, Kissinger says, “I believe they understand it today, yes.”

Suggesting indirectly that the White House didn’t understand it until now is as close as Kissinger gets to criticizing the Bush administration. When I bring up a comment he made on CNN in 2004 remarking that “they want to believe that Iraq could be occupied in the same manner” as Germany and Japan during World War II, but it “turned out to be wrong,” Kissinger suddenly doesn’t recall who “they” are: “I have no idea,” he says. “That was a general view that one could read. You will not get me to talk about any individual.”

When I point out that the foreign-policy advice buried deep in his 2,000-word newspaper articles might suggest a certain displeasure with the execution of the war, Kissinger demurs. “Displeasure, perhaps, is a strong word,” he says. “Uneasiness is a better word.”

Bob Woodward is amused when I tell him that Kissinger believes he “happens to be wrong” about his influence over the Bush administration. “Is Kissinger backtracking on Iraq?” He laughs. No matter. “What I’m reporting is the view of people like Cheney and people in the White House about Kissinger’s influence,” he says, “not Kissinger’s evaluation of his influence.”

Kissinger admitted to Woodward that he has met with Cheney every month and the president every other month since he took office. Whether this constitutes influence depends on your definition of influence: No doubt, Kissinger never minded being seen as influential, but he argues that meeting with the president half a dozen times a year hardly makes him the architect of a policy. Woodward counters that a total of 36 hours over six years adds up to more time with the president than almost any outsider ever.

Kissinger’s advice to Bush and Cheney, says Woodward, was “very soothing. That’s why they talked to him. It’s all part of the refusal to face reality. If you go back to the Nixon tapes, he’s a flatterer.”

Some of Kissinger’s closest friends are skeptical of his influence on the White House for this very same reason: his legendary sycophancy. Kissinger, they say, didn’t tell Bush and Cheney anything they didn’t want to hear.

“It’s good advertising for Kissinger, and it’s good advertising for the president,” says Brent Scowcroft. “They love that—especially Henry Kissinger—if they can go out and say, ‘Henry agrees with us.’ They want his support, they don’t want his views.”

“I think he likes to please people too much,” says Melvin Laird, the secretary of Defense during the Nixon administration. “You’ve got to be a little bit of a son of a bitch sometimes.” (Laird would know: During the Nixon years, he and Kissinger battled so fiercely for influence that Laird had Kissinger’s phone tapped to gain advantage.)

“The tragedy of Henry Kissinger is that he is a very large intellect joined to a very small man,” says Mark Danner, a foreign-policy writer who knows Kissinger. “No one is more brilliant, but in offering advice to policy-makers he invariably lets his obsession with his own access and influence corrupt what should be disinterested advice, tailoring his words to what he thinks the powerful want to hear. As a matter of character, he is more courtier than thinker.”

Kissinger, of course, takes issue with the notion that he’s a man who favors power over speaking truth to power. “It’s wrong,” he says. “It will make you popular with your friends in the New York intelligentsia if you say that, but it’s totally wrong.”

If Kissinger is, in his own careful description, uneasy about the execution of the war, and if he is not afraid to give the president an analysis that he might not want to hear, then what exactly was he telling Bush?

I frame the question by recalling Dean Acheson, Harry Truman’s secretary of State, whom Kissinger wrote about recently in The New York Times Book Review, mischievously calling him “perhaps the most vilified secretary of State in modern American history” (thereby relieving himself of the distinction). Acheson was one of a group of former statesmen dubbed “the Wise Men” who famously met with President Lyndon Johnson during the Tet Offensive in 1968 to tell him the Vietnam War was lost and he should pull out. Did Kissinger do an Acheson?

Kissinger is coy at first, allowing me to believe he just might have had a sobering conversation with Bush. Acheson, he says, smiling vaguely, “didn’t go out and see the press afterwards.”

Pushed further, however, Kissinger tacks the other way. Iraq may not have entered its version of the Tet Offensive, he says. And by the way, he explains, we’ve gotten the Tet Offensive all wrong. Tet was a military victory. “If you look back to the Tet Offensive and at what the media said, and I probably believed myself at the time, it was misunderstood, and it was a big victory for us.”

“It could have even been misunderstood by Acheson,” he adds.

“I could conceive that if our entry into Baghdad were working,” he says, “and if we were winning—and I’m not saying we are—that it might look similar to this.”

So Kissinger told Bush he was actually winning the war?

No, that’s not it either.

“The possibility exists that we talked about other things than Iraq,” Kissinger says, “and the vast majority of the conversation was about other things.

“And the possibility also exists,” he continues, “that the president wanted to get a different perspective, not only on Iraq but also on other aspects,” like North Korea and China.

Anything is possible, I suppose.

When he is not in Washington talking to the president about something, Henry Kissinger divides his time between his Manhattan apartment and his country estate in Kent, Connecticut. Poor health has forced him to cut down on travel and the number of boards he sits on, and he makes it to China just once a year. In what passes for Kissinger’s dotage, he scribbles notes for his next book on statecraft (written entirely in longhand), plays with his Labrador retriever, Abigail, and makes the rounds of Manhattan’s power parties.

“The power of Henry working a room is still seismic,” says Diane Sawyer, the Good Morning America host and former Nixon press aide who dated Kissinger in the early seventies. “All of a sudden everybody wants to step up their game and say something he’ll find interesting or funny.”

Kissinger has a legendary ability to charm when he wants to, and over the years, he has collected a sparkling assortment of high-powered friends—most of them Democrats—in the media, business, and fashion worlds. He is the frequent party companion of Tina Brown and Harry Evans, the latter of whom edited his 1979 book, White House Years. He has close business relationships with Pete Peterson, the chairman of the Blackstone Group, and Maurice “Hank” Greenberg, the former American International Group chief executive, who paid him enormous fees to help AIG gain access to China.

He bonds with Oprah Winfrey over their shared love of dogs (she recommended an artist to paint a portrait of Kissinger’s Lab) and with Alex Rodriguez over their shared love of the Yankees (he and A-Rod had lunch at The Four Seasons last year). He and his wife of 32 years, Nancy Maginnes, spend every Christmas with close friends Oscar and Annette de la Renta in the Dominican Republic. Asked about the nature of that friendship, given the unlikely connection between a former statesman and a fashion mogul, Kissinger says, “These are dear friends of mine; they have no utility.”

Kissinger’s roving among the powerful has occasionally landed him in bad company. He formed a tight bond with former Canadian media mogul Conrad Black, vacationing with him and joining the board of Hollinger International. Kissinger’s role at Hollinger was largely ceremonial, a hood ornament for Black, but when it was discovered that Black had been raiding the company’s coffers to pad his lifestyle, Kissinger joined the insurgency against him. “Et tu, Brute?” said Black on a conference call when Kissinger turned on him, according to the Black biography Shades of Black. (Describing Kissinger’s deep feelings of betrayal, one former business associate says, “He really believed that Conrad was a billionaire.”)

Still, Kissinger finds New York to be a safe haven, a place where he can be loved unconditionally. “Manhattan social life is more generous than Washington political life,” says Kissinger. “It’s not a blood sport.”

Most of the time anyway. Four years ago, Barbara Walters, who calls Kissinger “the most loyal friend,” was entertaining Kissinger and his wife at a dinner party for a D.C. politician when ABC News anchor Peter Jennings, who died last year, suddenly piped up, “How does it feel to be a war criminal, Henry?”

The subject of Kissinger’s past sins was very much in the air at the time. Judges in both France and Spain were seeking Kissinger for questioning as the long-simmering debate over his connection to Chilean general Augusto Pinochet’s brutal killing of dissidents in the seventies returned with a vengeance, not least in Christopher Hitchens’s ringing indictment, The Trial of Henry Kissinger. These developments clearly rattled Kissinger, who had preemptively written a lengthy article for Foreign Affairs decrying the dangerous legal precedent of using universal jurisdiction to try state actors for past actions (the same precedent under which German courts hope to try Donald Rumsfeld).

The question stunned the dinner guests, who included Time Inc. editor Henry Grunwald, who also died last year, and former ABC chairman Thomas Murphy. Grunwald told Jennings the comment was “unsuitable,” but Jennings persisted.

“I tried to change the subject, but it was a very uncomfortable moment,” says Walters. “Nancy reacted very strongly and hurt.”

Kissinger said nothing.

Friends say Kissinger’s entire life since leaving public office has been an incessant justification of his time in power, a meticulous shaping and reshaping of his legacy. “He never stops paying attention to his own reputation and record,” says a New York colleague who has known him since the seventies. “Never.”

Kissinger famously sequestered the taped transcripts of his Nixon-era phone calls in his own personal archive at the Library of Congress until lawyers working with the National Security Archive fought to return them to public domain in 2001 (prompting multiple revelations of Kissinger’s manipulative diplomacy). And his lengthy and detailed memoirs (three volumes, 3,971 pages in all) tend to reshape events to counter the perception that he was too conciliatory with the Soviets or that he enabled dictators to violate human rights.

Three years ago, he agreed to open up his White House diaries, letters, and archives to British historian Niall Ferguson, who is taking five years to write a biography. (Of a working session at Kissinger’s place in Kent one summer, he says, “I’m in Henry Kissinger’s swimming pool talking about his meetings with Mao Tse-tung, thinking, I must be dreaming.”) Ferguson claims that Kissinger wants him to write a warts-and-all biography, but Kissinger has rarely had anything but antagonistic relationships with his chroniclers.

“He wants to control not just what he says,” observes Woodward, who first interviewed him for 1974’s All the President’s Men, “but people’s perceptions of what he says. And it’s kind of like one long book review where he is arguing with the reviewer of his book or his life or his policy.”

Seymour Hersh, who wrote the 1983 Kissinger takedown The Price of Power, is more damning: “He lies like most people breathe.”

When Walter Isaacson’s 1992 biography of Kissinger was published, Kissinger complained bitterly to Isaacson’s boss, Henry Grunwald. According to Isaacson, when Grunwald replied that he thought the book was balanced and down the middle, Kissinger paused a moment, then rumbled, “What right does that young man have to be balanced and down the middle about me?”

Kissinger says the Grunwald incident never happened. “I’ve never read the Isaacson book,” he says, then quickly clarifies. “I’ve read a few parts of the Isaacson book, which I didn’t like. But I understand that there are many parts of the book that are very positive.

“I missed those,” he says with a sly smile.

Isaacson says Kissinger wrote him a series of letters contesting numerous passages. “My view is that if Kissinger reread his own memoirs, he would be outraged that they did not treat him favorably enough,” says Isaacson.

Kissinger claims to be unconcerned about his place in history.

“I cannot affect my legacy,” he says.

And what does he think his legacy is?

“I have no view,” he says. “I can’t control it by what I say.”

I tell him I don’t believe him.

“You’re not in your eighties yet,” he replies.

But many people think Kissinger still has much to answer for, namely his actions during the Nixon and Ford years in Cambodia, Chile, East Timor, and Cyprus, not to mention Vietnam. For Kissinger, the details are always too complex to really hold him to account. Having watched Errol Morris’s documentary The Fog of War, an extended look at former secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s grappling with his failures in Vietnam, Kissinger says, “I thought he sold himself short. I thought he oversimplified and didn’t give himself enough credit.”

Kissinger himself is not one to make apologies. When I ask him if his thinking has evolved since Vietnam, he is quiet for a few moments. Finally, he says, “I mean, you can say there was a harshness to realism that was mitigated over the years; it’s a beautiful thing to say. It does not accord with what my intellectual record is.”

He bristles when I bring up his human-rights critics. “I won’t discuss that,” he says, except to say that “the Hitchens type has no impact on me whatsoever.” (Hitchens says that when he saw Kissinger on a New York-to-D.C. shuttle flight in October, “he walked with surprising speed away. He put on a good pace.”)

But his friend Senator John McCain says Kissinger is privately hurt by the charges that he prolonged the Vietnam War and allowed tens of thousands of GIs to die for nothing. “He’s been so badly stung by the criticism and condemnation over the years, and I understand that,” he says. “But I also think he’s frustrated by his critics because they don’t tell him anything he should have done; they just blame him for it.”

As for Kissinger’s involvement in the current international debacle, McCain, taking a subtle dig at the White House, points to the outcome of the war as evidence that Bush and Cheney have never really listened to Kissinger. “I think the question should be asked how much they consulted with him before the invasion was initiated,” he says. Even if Kissinger had advised Bush to change course, it’s doubtful the famously bullheaded president would’ve listened anyway, he suggests. “I’m not sure Kissinger, if—and I emphasize if—he felt that way, it would have that effect.”

Unprompted, McCain, who has known Kissinger since 1973, says of their friendship, “I’m not at all embarrassed about it; I’m proud of it.” (But during the 2000 presidential race, his handlers opted not to have the two appear publicly together, fearing the legendary obfuscator would taint the image of the “Straight Talk Express.”)

Asked if he’ll support McCain if he runs for president in 2008, Kissinger says, “Very likely.” Then he corrects himself: “Almost certainly. I don’t have to qualify that.”

It’s the most unequivocal thing he’s said to me yet.

Weeks have passed since Kissinger and I first spoke, and he is still obsessing over Woodward’s “Don’t give an inch” quote. “To what is it I said we shouldn’t give an inch?” he asks. “To whom shouldn’t we give an inch?”

But Kissinger himself is starting to give an inch. The world—or at least the political climate—has changed. Americans’ approval of Bush’s handling of Iraq has dropped to an all-time low of 31 percent. After taking control of both houses of Congress, Democrats are pushing for troop withdrawals within months. And the White House is making noise about “flexibility” and being open to new ideas on Iraq (although Bush, in Vietnam recently, was still oddly echoing old-school Kissinger doctrine: “We’ll succeed unless we quit”).

As the power shifts, Kissinger is shifting along with it. Now that the Iraq Study Group, led by former secretary of State James Baker and former Democratic congressman Lee Hamilton, is hammering out a new strategy for Bush, Kissinger is carefully aligning himself with the pragmatic fixers coming in from the cold instead of the enablers who supported the war all along.

After arguing for 30 years that Vietnam was lost because a Democratic Congress failed to live up to its promises, he says he now believes the country needs a bipartisan approach to strategy in Iraq. Regarding troop withdrawals, he says he’s never been against the idea as long as it’s “tied to an overall strategy.”

Whatever the Baker-Hamilton report comes up with, he says, “I will stretch to try to support it.” (The study group recently interviewed Kissinger, who is calling for an international conference with Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran.) Of Donald Rumsfeld, Kissinger will only say, “I feel deeply for him at this moment. It’s a very tragic situation to be in at the end of his public life.” On Rumsfeld’s replacement, Robert Gates, a former CIA director under President Bush’s father and a critic of Rumsfeld’s handling of the war, Kissinger predicts that he and Gates will have “probably very parallel views.”

Last week in London, Kissinger even went so far as to announce that he believes military victory in Iraq impossible and that we have to move to “some international definition of what a legitimate outcome is.”

Sounding like an old realist again, Kissinger tells me that the United States can live with a nondemocratic Iraq. “We may not have any choice,” he says. “It’s a worthwhile goal. You just have to understand the consequences of what you’re saying. You cannot say we want to get out in eighteen months and we want a democratic Iraq. We cannot have both.”

And neither can Kissinger. When I point out that he’s hedging again, trying to have it both ways, he smiles and gives me one last spin.

“At the age of 84,” he says, with a twinkle in his eye, “what great ambitions can I have?”

Henry Kissinger, ever the revisionist, is 83.


Tuesday, October 03, 2006

Novo livro de Paulo Roberto de Almeida

O estudo das relações internacionais do Brasil:
Um diálogo entre a diplomacia e a academia
Brasília: LGE Editora, 2006
(http://www.lgeeditora.com.br/)

Lançamentos:

Brasília: 9 de outubro, 19hs, no Centro de Convenções Ulysses Guimarães, no quadro da III Conferência Mundial de Relações Internacionais.

Salvador: 20 de outubro, 18h30, na UFBA, no quadro do ciclo de conferências Santiago Dantas, organizado conjuntamente com o Instituto Romulo de Almeida de Altos Estudos.

Recife: 17 de novembro, as 19h30, na FIR - Faculdade Integrada Recife, em palestra sobre relações internacionais do Brasil.
Outros locais: a determinar...
Sumário, arte da capa e arquivos de alguns capitulos do livro, neste link:
http://www.pralmeida.org/01Livros/2FramesBooks/93EstudoRelaIntBr2006.html

Autor: Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Doutor em ciências sociais. Mestre em economia internacional. Diplomata de carreira. (pagina pessoal: www.pralmeida.org)

Mais informações sobre o livro:

Dotado de uma perspectiva essencialmente didática e voltado para a pesquisa e o ensino das relações internacionais do Brasil, o livro, especialmente focado na história das relações econômicas internacionais, oferece um panorama abrangente do itinerário seguido pelo Brasil no contexto mundial. Instrumento de pesquisa, tanto quanto de referência cronológica e de informação sobre a literatura disponível na área, a obra acompanha, de modo eclético, diversas disciplinas dos cursos de relações internacionais.

O livro foi construído ao longo de muitos anos de contato com os documentos típicos das chancelarias – os tratados internacionais – e na leitura atenta dos episódios políticos por eles descritos, que são os fatos básicos ou a matéria prima da história, processos materiais que dão sentido à evolução do mundo contemporâneo.

O primeiro capítulo, relativo à produção brasileira em relações internacionais, consolida leituras e consultas aos autores ali apresentados, reunindo o essencial da “manufatura” brasileira nesse campo relativamente novo de estudos multidisciplinares. Ele permite sustentar a pergunta básica: “o que se deve ler para conhecer essa área?”

Os demais capítulos analíticos e interpretativos, condensam algumas décadas de pesquisa, de estudo e de redação paciente e cuidadosa de trabalhos diversos sobre a história diplomática, sobre as relações exteriores, atuais, do Brasil, e sobre as relações econômicas internacionais de modo geral. O contato, não só com os arquivos, mas também com a documentação de uso corrente e, mais importante, a presença em muitos foros de discussão e negociação de alguns desses eventos e processos interessando às relações internacionais do Brasil – quer seja pelo lado da integração, do sistema multilateral de comércio ou ainda das finanças internacionais –permitiram ao autor um conhecimento de primeira mão de alguns dos episódios ou processos descritos no livro.

Trata-se de uma contribuição objetiva para a apreensão do panorama complexo que são as relações internacionais de um país tão contraditório como é o Brasil: um gigante industrial e, ao mesmo tempo, um anão tecnológico; uma grande potência econômica pela sua produção bruta, mas com os pés de barro em virtude de uma população singularmente deseducada e socialmente marcada por terríveis iniqüidades distributivas; um grande fornecedor mundial de muitas matérias primas essenciais para o funcionamento, a todo vapor, das “fornalhas do capitalismo” e um pretenso global trader conspicuamente ausente dos setores mais dinâmicos do comércio mundial.

O livro informa e discute algumas das características e alguns dos componentes de nossa evolução histórica no terreno da política externa e das relações internacionais, com ênfase em seus aspectos econômicos e institucionais.

Sumário resumido:

Introdução: o estudo das Relações Internacionais do Brasil
1. A produção brasileira em relações internacionais: avaliação, tendências e perspectivas
2. O Brasil no contexto econômico mundial: 1820-2006
3. A estrutura constitucional das relações internacionais no Brasil
4. A periodização das relações internacionais do Brasil
5. Cronologia das relações internacionais do Brasil, 1415-2006
Guia da produção em relações internacionais do Brasil e bibliografia geral
Guia de periódicos nacionais e estrangeiros em relações internacionais

Sumário completo:

Prefácio à segunda edição
Introdução: o estudo das Relações Internacionais do Brasil

Capítulo I
A produção brasileira em relações internacionais: avaliação, tendências e perspectivas
1. Introdução: peculiaridades do campo relações internacionais no Brasil
1.1. Ensino: teoria quantitativa da multiplicação didática
1.2. Pesquisa: dispersão metodológica e baixa integração
2. Elaboração crescente, reflexão difusa: produção e grandes eixos analíticos
2.1. A “pré-história” das Relações Internacionais no Brasil
2.2. A “acumulação primitiva” da disciplina na academia
2.3. A explosão dos anos 80 e a “abertura” diplomática
2.4. A academia desafia o “monopólio” diplomático
2.5. Revolução “keynesiana” na produção acadêmica?
3. Orientações disciplinares, escolhas teórico-metodológicas
3.1. Sistema e estrutura como paradigmas de análise
3.2. A história como experiência única de inserção internacional
4. Autores e obras: balanço seletivo
4.1. Dos “founding fathers” aos pesquisadores profissionais
4.2. As revistas e os foros brasileiros de relações internacionais
5. O Brasil e o mundo: tendências analíticas
6. Perspectivas do estudo das relações internacionais no Brasil
Quadros analíticos:
1. Cursos de bacharelado em relações internacionais, Brasil, 1974-2007
2. Cursos de pós-graduação stricto sensu relacionados à temática de relações internacionais, Brasil, 1969-2007
3. Instituições voltadas para ensino, pesquisa e promoção de eventos em relações internacionais, Brasil, 1930-2006
4. Periódicos no campo das relações internacionais, Brasil, 1839-2006
5. Produção brasileira em relações internacionais, 1945-2006

Capítulo II
O Brasil no contexto econômico mundial: 1820-2006
1. O Brasil e a economia mundial desde o início do século XIX
2. O Brasil de 1820 a 1870: partida difícil, baixa dispersão mundial
3. O Brasil de 1870 a 1913: crescimento modesto, ascensão do café
4. O mundo entre 1913 e 1950: catástrofes econômicas e sociais
5. O grande crescimento de 1950 a 1973: a Ásia e o Brasil decolam
6. Crescimento e crise de 1973 a 1998: as diferenças se acentuam
7. O Brasil e a América Latina no contexto mundial: o longo prazo e a atualidade
Tabelas estatísticas:
1. Crescimento histórico do PIB do Brasil, 1960-2003
2. Crescimento da população, do PIB e do PIB per capita, Brasil e EUA, 1820-1998
3. Evolução histórica do PIB per capita, países selecionados, 1820-1998
4. Taxas médias de crescimento anual do PIB per capita, 1820-1998
5. Taxas de crescimento demográfico, países selecionados, 1820-1998
6. Variação do volume das exportações, países selecionados, 1820-1998
7. Exportações de mercadorias em % do PIB, 1820-1998
8. Desvio histórico comparativo do PIB per capita do Brasil, 1820-1998
9. Evolução histórica comparada do PIB per capita, 1820-1998
10. Evolução comparada do comércio exterior, 1800-1912
11. Exportações mais importações de bens e serviços sobre o PIB, 2005
12. PIB per capita e taxas de crescimento de países selecionados, 1995-2004
13. Relação do crescimento do PIB com o crescimento do PIB mundial, 1988-2005

Capítulo III
A estrutura constitucional das relações internacionais no Brasil
1. O controle constitucional das relações exteriores
2. A experiência constitucional brasileira
3. As relações internacionais segundo a Constituição de 1988
4. Implicações para a política externa do Brasil
5. As emendas constitucionais da ordem econômica
6. Estrutura constitucional e sistema político
Quadros analíticos:
1. Emendas constitucionais com impacto nas relações econômicas internacionais
2. Dispositivos constitucionais discriminatórios ao investimento estrangeiro

Capítulo IV
A periodização das relações internacionais do Brasil
1. Tipologia cronológica das relações internacionais do Brasil
2. A era colonial como parte constitutiva da periodização
3. Cronologia temática das relações internacionais do Brasil
4. Dos primórdios ao processo de independência, 1415-1808
5. Independência e consolidação do Estado, 1808/1822-1844/1850
6. Apogeu e declínio do Império: 1850-1889
7. A República se afirma, 1889-1902
8. A era do Barão, 1902-1912
9. A República dos bacharéis, 1912-1930
10. Crise e fechamento internacional: 1930-1945
11 Uma política exterior tradicional: 1945-1960
12. A política externa independente: 1961-1964
13. A volta ao alinhamento, 1964-1967
14. Revisão ideológica e busca de autonomia tecnológica: 1967-1985
15. Redefinição das prioridades e afirmação da vocação regional: 1985-2006
Quadros analíticos:
1. Vetores das relações econômicas internacionais do Brasil, 1500-2006
2. Estrutura e contexto da diplomacia econômica no Brasil, 1808-1891
3. Evolução conceitual da diplomacia econômica no Brasil, séculos XIX-XX

Capítulo V
Cronologia das relações internacionais do Brasil, 1415-2006
1. Primórdios das descobertas, 1415-1498
2. Do descobrimento à união ibérica, 1500-1639
3. A economia colonial, 1641-1755
4. Crise do sistema colonial, 1756-1808
5. O processo da independência, 1808-1822
6. A consolidação do Estado, 1822-1850
7. Ascensão e declínio do Império, 1850-1889
8. República Velha: a diplomacia do café, 1889-1929
9. O Brasil na crise do entre-guerras, 1930-1939
10. No turbilhão do conflito militar, 1939-1945
Quadros analíticos:
1. Brasil: evolução da política comercial, 1889-1945
2. Brasil: evolução da política comercial, 1945-2006
3. Relações internacionais, processos multilaterais e regionais e política externa do Brasil, 1944-2006

Guia da produção em relações internacionais do Brasil e bibliografia geral
Guia de periódicos nacionais e estrangeiros em relações internacionais
Livros do autor

OBSERVAÇÃO:
O prefácio, a introdução, os quadros analíticos do primeiros capítulo e os anexos bibliográficos encontram-se disponíveis neste link:
http://www.pralmeida.org/01Livros/2FramesBooks/93EstudoRelaIntBr2006.html

Monday, September 25, 2006

Eu também ACREDITO...

Acredito...

Em algumas verdades simples, muito simples:

Que a palavra do homem é uma só,
que todos têm o dever social e individual da verdade, que ela é única e imutável.
que devemos, sim, assumir, nossas responsabilidades pelos cargos que ocupamos,
que não podemos descarregar sobre outros o peso dessas responsabilidades,
que devemos sempre procurar saber o que acontece, em nossa casa ou trabalho,
que não devemos jactar-nos indevidamente por grandes ou pequenas realizações,
que sempre nos beneficiamos do legado dos antepassados, sobretudo em conhecimento,
que nenhuma obra social possui paternidade única e exclusiva, sendo mais bem coletiva,
que a tentativa de excluir antecessores ou auxiliares é antipática e contraproducente,
que devemos zelar pelo dinheiro público,
que temos o dever de pensar nas próximas gerações, não na situação imediata,
que vaidade é uma coisa muito feia, além de ridícula,
que sensação de poder pode perturbar a capacidade de raciocínio,
que poder concentrado desequilibra o processo decisório,
que ouvir apenas elogios embota o senso da realidade,
que o convívio exclusivo com áulicos perturba a faculdade de julgamento,
que, enfim, não comandamos ao julgamento da história.

Eu também aprendi, que os resultados são sempre mais importantes do que as intenções, mas que os fins não justificam os meios...

Acredito, para terminar, que coisas simples assim podem ser partilhadas com outros...


Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Brasília, 25 de setembro de 2006

Saskia Sassen - O Estado na Globalização (entrevista).

Entrevista ao programa Milênio da Globo News

O Estado na Globalização

A professora da London School of Economics Saskia Sassen pesquisa a maneira como o Estado se comporta na época atual, onde a iniciativa privada parece controlar a locomotiva econômica da história.

http://gmc.globo.com/GMC/0,,2465-p-M546170,00.html

Sunday, September 17, 2006

Nova ordem econômica?

The world economy

Surprise!
Sep 14th 2006
FromThe Economist print edition

A new economic order
The balance of economic power in the world is changing

IF ECONOMISTS have a tendency to trust their figures too much, politicians often pay numbers too little attention; and they do so at their peril. Napoleon dismissed Britain as a nation of shopkeepers, but its emerging might as a trading power helped fight him off. In the cold war Western strategists probably spent too much time worrying about the Soviet Union's military clout, and not enough analysing its commercial frailties. Economics does not determine history, but it does provide the backbeat. And something dramatic has been happening to the numbers recently.
As our survey this week points out, the emerging world now accounts for over half of global economic output, measured in purchasing-power parity (which allows for lower prices in poorer countries). Many economists prefer to measure GDP using current exchange rates (which put the emerging world's proportion closer to 30%). But even on this basis the newcomers accounted for well over half of the growth in global output last year. And a barrage of statistics shows economic power shifting away from the developed economies (basically North America, western Europe, Japan and Australasia) towards emerging ones, especially in Asia. Developing countries chew up over half of the world's energy and hold most of its foreign-exchange reserves. Their share of exports has jumped from 20% in 1970 to 43% today. And, although Africa still lags behind, the growth is fairly broadly spread: they may be the most talked about, yet Brazil, Russia, India and China account for only two-fifths of emerging-world output.
No social or economic change this big takes place without friction. The most obvious sign is the uproar about jobs being outsourced to India and China. The howls will get louder as globalisation affects ever-richer voters. But there are wider ramifications too. In Asia China's rise has helped push Japan and India closer to the United States, and South Korea further away from it. The once-poor world is scouring the earth for mineral rights, trying to buy Californian oil firms, accounting for ever more carbon emissions and making its weight felt in international negotiations on everything from trade to proliferation to the secretary-generalship of the United Nations.
An idea whose time has come, again
There are weaknesses in some of the growth stories. China's population is ageing and India's schools are rotten. Perhaps the emerging world won't continue to motor along at nearly three times the rich world's pace. Maybe it will take a little longer than 2040 to fulfil Goldman Sachs's prediction that the world's ten biggest economies, using market exchange rates, will include Brazil, Russia, Mexico, India and China. But these are arguments about when, not whether, change will happen. And things could speed up: even the rosiest predictions underestimated Asia's ability to recover from its 1997 financial crisis.
This shift is not as extraordinary as it first seems. A historical perspective shows it to be the restoration of the old order. After all, China and India were the world's biggest economies until the mid-19th century, when technology and a spirit of freedom enabled the West to leap ahead. Nor should it be regarded as frightening. The West, as well as hundreds of millions of people in developing countries, has benefited from emerging-world growth. Globalisation is not a zero-sum game: Mexicans, Koreans and Poles are not growing at the expense of Americans, Japanese and Germans. Developing countries already buy half the combined exports of America, Japan and the euro area. As they get richer they will buy more. The world is on course for its fastest-ever decade of growth in GDP per head, which has been powering ahead at an annual rate of 3.2% since 2000”far faster than during the great period of globalisation that ended with the first world war.
Some where, over the rainbow
If that comparison raises spectres, so it should. A century ago Edwardian globalists were predicting ever more peace and prosperity”only to see those dreams blown apart on the fields of Flanders. The momentum behind globalisation is considerable; but pushing trade barriers lower depends on political will. It is doubtful that any American president would follow the example of the Chinese emperor Qianlong, who announced in 1793 that the then economic superpower had no interest in foreign manufactures, setting his country on the road to two centuries of impoverishment. But there are a few worrying omens in the air, notably the collapse of the Doha round of trade talks.
Protectionism and xenophobia should be fought wherever they spring up. But it is also worth acknowledging that these bumptious new economic powers have made the world more complicated for Western policymakers. For instance, although they have helped keep inflation and interest rates down, they have also encouraged asset prices to bubble up. They have allowed America to finance its massive current-account deficit with apparent impunity. Righting these imbalances will be tricky, even if the strength of emerging economies makes the world less dependent on America.
But the two main challenges for the West are long-term political ones. One has to do with accepting that there will be some Western victims of globalisation. Adding 1.5 billion people to the global labour force has boosted the return to capital and richly rewarded rich Westerners; but in Germany, Japan and the United States, real wages for the median worker have barely budged. None of this is an excuse for protectionism”unless you want to make everybody poorer. But there may be fiercer debates, even in America, about using the tax and benefits system to redistribute more of the winnings.The other challenge has to do with geopolitics. As the balance of economic power in the world changes, mustn't the balance of political power change too?
In time, perhaps. But economic power is not the same as political power. Most developing countries are still military pipsqueaks: China does not yet own a single aircraft-carrier, and its defence budget is less than the annual increase in America's. Nor in political terms is there such a thing as an emerging block: no alliance of interests brings all these very different countries together in the way that history and culture have united America and Europe. In Asia, for example, the rise of China is balanced by the rise of India, which America is striving to turn into a strategic partner.
But there is also plainly a need to fiddle with some of the global political architecture. The IMF will tinker with the power structure of the fund at its annual meeting next week. Others should follow. The UN Security Council”whose permanent members include Britain and France but exclude Japan, India and Brazil”has long looked outdated and will soon look absurd. Similarly, it does not make much sense for the G7, supposedly the world's main economic club, to discuss currencies when China, which holds the largest official reserves, is not a member.
Making such adjustments will no doubt be awkward. But these are the problems of success. A world in which most people enjoy prosperity and opportunity is surely better than one in which 80% are mired in economic stagnation. Celebrate the riches that globalisation has brought”and be prepared to defend the economic liberalisation that underpins it.

Thursday, August 10, 2006

Recomeçando...


Devido a problemas no blog www.itmachado.blogspot.com tive que criar este novo.
O www.ecoeri.blogspot.com serguirá na mesma linha temática de seu antecessor...
O objetivo fundamental é a troca de idéias sobre temas ligados a política, economia, relações internacionais e cultura em geral.
Meus caros colegas, sejam bem-vindos mais uma vez.
BOA LEITURA!

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